An essay I submitted for my mid-terms on Hegel and the ethical life.

Question: How persuasive is Hegel’s argument that conscience needs an ethical system?

In this essay I am going to give an account of Hegel’s explication of the development from abstract right to morality to ethical being in his 1821 Philosophy of Right (PR). I will also provide an overview of the dialectical logic that is play in his argument. I will focus on the stages of morality and ethical being to set up the discussion of whether it follows from Hegel’s argument that conscience requires an ethical system. I will argue that the most important aspect of Hegel’s explication of the development of ethical consciousness for this discussion is the middle stage of morality where the subjective self-consciousness is faced with a choice as to which principle to use as a basis for practical action: between the universal principle and the particular principle. Both principles continue the development of consciousness and ethics toward the absolute good and ethical life. However, the latter principle, if adopted, mistakes the subjective will for the absolute good and may determine any action as good. This is a path toward evil instead of good. As there is this necessary moment where the particular subjective self-conscious may mistake his particular own volition as a principle for determining what is good for himself and for everyone else, I will suggest that it follows from Hegel’s argument that an ethical system is necessary to see this project through to its completion at ethical life. To counter this argument, I will offer the suggestion that for Hegel, this dynamic is necessarily always at play and that conscience is necessarily a part of, or a moment in, an ethical system and so cannot be without the system that Hegel put’s forward.

G.W.F Hegel’s (1821) Philosophy of Right was published during his time at the University of Berlin two years after his arrival after spending eight years at the University of Heidelberg in Nuremberg. This mature work of Hegel’s focuses on the philosophy of objective mind which he divides into three developmental stages: abstract right, morality, and ethical life. This developmental process is the working out of the particular and collective human conscious spirit in history which progressively gains a more fundamental knowledge of itself (Wood, 1993 p.217). This process begins with the most abstract conceptions and as it progresses it passes through increasingly concrete and objective moments and culminates in the most concrete and objective Absolute universal conception of ethics (PR §129 p.157), upon which individual and collective action is based (PR §130 p.158). This ultimate end of the human journey of consciousness is the point at which true substantial freedom is realised and the appropriate principle for determining duties are established; for Hegel, this is the good (PR §149 p.192, §129 p.157).

Before going on to describe each of these stages I want to say something about the logic that is being used throughout this work and many of Hegel’s later works such as the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). This logic is the logic of the dialectic and is the process upon which history operates for Hegel, and by which concepts about how we describe experience; organise society; determine what is right and wrong are established, corrected, and moved beyond. This logic is distinct from classical propositional logic; it is a logic for a living process (Kroner in Knox, 1948 p.30). The process is motivated by the unification of seeming contradictions which are defined both in terms of what they are and what they are not, which gives rise to a set of contradictions that make up the moments in a turn of the dialectic (McTaggart & McTaggart, 1922 p.1). Importantly, each moment of a turn, as one side of a pair of contradictions, has within it the idea of its unity which is its essence. The more concrete idea that is arrived at following the unification was implicit in the seemingly distinct categories to begin with. If we then follow this process to its completion we arrive at the most concrete and objective category for each of our philosophical domains and the enterprise of philosophy itself; the universal Absolute Mind (Reyburn, H. 1921 p.15).

Hegel offers us an account of this logic in the Philosophy of Right at the end of the section on morality while giving an overview of the development of the abstract good and the abstract subjectivity discussed thus far. Each of them has:

“…their opposite present within them, the good its actuality, and subjectivity the good; but since they are one-sided, they are not yet posited as what they are in themselves. They become posited in their negativity, for as they one sidedly constitute themselves as independent totalities, both refusing to accept what is present within them…” (PR §141 p.185)

From here these moments cancel each other out (sich aufheben) in becoming moments of a more concrete concept which realises itself through the unity of the two moments. This new concept is the “Idea” which has within it abstract good and abstract subjectivity and raises them to actuality in the form of universal ethical life; the third and highest stage of Hegel’s ethical dialectic (PR §141 p.185). For Hegel, the nature of human beings is that they are essentially universal and not a mere abstraction; they are embedded as a particular in a web of others all which cannot be understood fully outside of this universal perspective (PR §132 p.160).

The middle stage, morality, is where abstract right has been superseded by abstract good, a more concrete notion of the good but still abstract; and abstract subjectivity has been superseded by subjective self-determination, again a more concrete notion of the particular will and volition but still abstract as both are beneath the status of ethical life (PR §137 p.165). It is morality that is concerned with actions and their consequences (Wood, 1993 p.217). What is the nature of this particular will? For Hegel, this subjective will only has any value if the principles upon which it wishes to base actions are in accordance with the good (PR §131 p.158), which as we have seen is the realisation of true universal freedom. At this stage of the development from morality to ethics there is a juncture where either the process continues oriented toward the good and ethical life, or it deviates; we are then at risk of committing great evil as either are abstract moments (PR §140. p.174). How does this evil come about?

This conscience, subjective will, is defined as the absolute inward certainty of self (PR §131 p.158) and is a moment on the way to the destination of this abstract conscience: true conscience, as “the disposition to will what is good in and for itself”, which is attained at the final stage of ethical life (PR §137 p.164 emphasis in original). However, in the stage of morality, abstract conscience can mistake itself for the universal principle and determine what is good and right for himself and for others based on his own judgements; in so doing prioritising particularity over the universal (PR §139 p.167).

Once abstract self-determining subjectivity arrives at this stage of spirit, the remainder of the processes is dependent upon what happens next. Hegel put this quite clearly himself:

“Conscience, as [abstract] subjectivity, consists simply in the possibility of turning at any moment to evil; for both morality and evil have their common root in that self-certainty which has being for itself and knows and resolves for itself” (PR §139 p.167).

Importantly, Hegel is using ‘morality’ in this quote to mean moral action and is not referring to the stage in which this is happening. So, moral/good and evil actions have their common root in that self-certainty. At this point subjective abstract self-determining conscience may choose to have as the determining principle of the will “universality as inner objectivity, i.e., the good” which avoids evil, or may choose particularity which is opposed to universality; “In this case the inwardness of the will is evil” (PR §139 p.168).

Hegel goes on to give an extended account of the kinds of evil and hypocrisy which arise following the self-consciousness’ declaring it’s judgements as good, even when the actions justified may usually be considered wrong or even evil as this subjectivity mistakenly or shrewdly declares itself absolute universality. Hegel considers it especially evil when this subjectivity knows that it has the power to declare itself absolute and justify any action by its own rationale as good not only for itself, but also for the universal self-consciousness (PR §140 p.170-184). While this evil is not desirable from Hegel’s perspective this is not a complete catastrophe as he considers the subjective will capable of both good and evil and that it is in the stage of morality where this subjectivity is confronted with the choice and whichever decision is made eventually leads onto the transition from morality to ethical life:

“…subjectivity, as abstract self-determination and pure certainty of self alone, evaporates into itself all determinate aspects of right, duty, and existence, inasmuch as it is the power of judgement which determines solely from within itself what is good in relation to a given content, and at the same time the power to which the good, which is at first only an Idea and an obligation, owes it actuality” (PR §138 p.166).

The Idea, which is the unity of the abstract good and abstract subjectivity into the concrete ethical life and ultimate expression of freedom, owes its actuality to this moment. Where subjectivity, mistaking its determining principles as concrete ethical judgement, chooses either the path of good or evil: “Everything which arises in the ethical realm is produced by this activity of the spirit… while it is right to evaporate right or duty into subjectivity, it is on the other hand wrong if this abstract foundation is not in turn developed” (PR §138 p.166 Addition). What is wrong for Hegel is that which slows down or halts the dialectical process from moving toward Absolute spirit and ethical life.

So far, I have laid out an overview of the development of conscience from abstract right to morality to ethical life, where the conscience is confronted with a choice as to which principle - particularity or universality - is to ground the volition of the subjective will where one of the paths available is good and the other evil. The former because it is in accordance with the good i.e., ethical life, the latter because it deviates from the good and uses its own judgement to make the good evil and the evil good (PR §140 p.183). From this we can begin to see why Hegel sees the need for his system of ethics to guide the various particular subjectivities in the development of their own spirit and the spirit of civil society and ultimately the state. If the goodness or evilness of the state is contingent on its members acting in accordance with a universal principle such that their freedom is to be truly realised only at the end goal of ethical life (PR §149 p.192), then it would be necessary for there to be an ethical system in place to guide this process. This would help make the abstract subjectivities conscious of their lowly level of practice, as well as the hitherto failings of philosophy and academics, such that they can then orient themselves towards the higher ideals of morality and finally ethical life (PR §140 p.177).

It would be beneficial for the members of a society, guided by the structures and institutions of the state (PR §157 p.197), to be made aware of the dynamics of their consciousness and the stages they go through, individually and as a universal collective, so that the actions of as many people as possible are in accordance with the good and ethical life. Where welfare has validity as it is universal in ethical life and not merely individual welfare - which is a possibility in the stage of morality (PR §130 p.157) - where the duty to do what is right is done to bring about the welfare of oneself as well as the welfare of others (PR §134 p.161). As such, given Hegel’s explication of the dynamics of thought and ethical life, it is very convincing, if not an ethical imperative, that conscience needs an ethical system for the ultimate expression of their freedom to be found in the unity of particularity and universality, of objectivity and subjectivity, and of abstract and concrete. As expressed by Richard Kroner in his introductory chapter Hegel’s Philosophical Development which appeared in T.M Knox’s (1948) Early Theological Writings, “Life is substantial unity, undivided totality. All lines separating spheres or zones of living unity are artificial, mechanical, coercive. They tear asunder what belongs together and rend the unity of life.” Hegel’s philosophical project, which includes his ethical project, is to restore this unity of life.

Before concluding, I will offer somewhat of an objection to the point that this argument is convincing. It is less of an objection and more of a point of definition which alters the meaning of the question I have tried to answer. For Hegel, conscience is a moment in the dialectical development of human particular and universal spirit which culminates as a unification of all its former abstract moments in objective universal Absolute mind, expressed as an Ideal in the state and its institutions. The question as to whether particular or universal conscience needs an ethical system is a strange one given that, for Hegel, conscience is a part of the ethical system. As Hegel succinctly puts it:

“…an immanent and consistent theory of duties can be nothing other than the development of those relations which are necessitated by the Idea of freedom, and are therefore actual in their entirety, within the state” (PR §148 p.192).

In other words, the only consistent theory of duties can be an articulation of the dialectical process. This includes all its lower, abstract moments that have been cancelled out and unified in increasingly concrete concepts until arriving at the Idea of freedom, which is the good actualised within the state and its various institutions which include civil society, the family, and individuals. Conscience cannot do without this ethical system because it is essentially a part of that system.

To conclude, in this essay I have given an account of Hegel’s explication from The Philosophy of Right. Focusing mostly on the stages of morality and ethical Life, and the choice the abstract subjectivity must make in grounding his volition - his subjective will - with either the principle of particularity or universality; where evil is possible if the former is chosen. I argued that this juncture, which may hold back a society from achieving ethical life if the former is chosen, suggests that the need for an ethical system is convincing. However, I also highlighted that conscience is itself a part of the ethical system for Hegel and is necessarily contained within in it and so, by definition, is this system of ethics it requires.

Bibliography:

Hegel G.W.F (1991) Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1821).

Knox, T.M. & Kroner, R. (1948) Hegel’s Philosophical Development. In Early Theological Writings. University of Chicago.

McTaggart, J. & McTaggart, E. (1922) Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic. Cambridge University Press.

Miller, A.V. (1977) Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Oxford University Press (Original work published 1807).

Reyburn, H.A (1921) The Ethical Theory of Hegel: A Study of the Philosophy of Right. Oxford At the Clarendon Press.

Wood. A (1993) Hegel’s Ethics in F.C. Besier (Ed) The Cambridge Companion to Hegel. Cambridge University Press. Pages 211-233. [Online] Available from: https://doi-org.ezproxy.is.ed.ac.uk/10.1017/CCOL0521382742. [Accessed: 25^th October 2023].